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ABSTRACT
As general purpose robots begin to find their way into the household and
workplace, there will be a demand for software to run on these robots. My
research group forsees the proliferation of robot apps that use a common set
of abstractions to allow them to function on a variety of hardware platforms.
In this thesis, I introduce a robot operating system to support these apps
and detail the abstractions that it provides. I present many lessons learned
from developing and debugging a number of such apps, and discuss a novel
concept wherein apps and libraries are allowed to seek help from outside
sources when they are unable to accomplish their goals. I show that our
framework allows a robot to effectivly deal with challenges, such as user
authentication. I demonstrate a simple bartender app to fetch drink orders
for students, and it is succesfully able to deliver them in 10/10 trials in real-
world conditions. I also present CLASS, a new system capable of identifying
users robustly. I propose a framework for integrating a wide range of sensor
values into an algorithm for identifying users, even if an attacker actively tries
to impersonate a user. Our system is evaluated by using our reference robot
and this platform to build a robot application that buys coffee at our local
coffee shop for a user, without requiring explicit authentication. I evaluate
CLASS under an adversarial model experimentally and find it to be robust
and resilient to attack.
ii
To Sam King, for sending me this email:
Hi Murph,
Are you interested at all in grad school? If so, I would like to
discuss it with you. If not, I would like the chance to convince
you otherwise.
Cheers, Sam
iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I’d like to thank my girlfriend, Renee, for all the support she has given
me and for moving to Champaign to keep me company while I was a grad
student. I’m sure there were more interesting places to live, sorry!
I also owe my sanity to our two dogs, Tessy and Totoro. It’s tough to have
dogs while in school, but it’s worth it.
I’d also like to thank Corbin Souffrant for all his hard work as my under-
graduate research assistant.
A shout-out to the ##uiuc IRC channel for keeping life entertaining, and
to /r/uiuc on Reddit for keeping me connected.
Thanks to my roommate, Kevin Larson, for never minding my occasionally
chaotic grad student life.
And, of course, I’d like to thank my parents for making college possible.
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
CHAPTER 2 FRAMEWORK FOR ROBOT APPLICATIONS . . . . 4
2.1 Design principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2 Hardware architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3 Software architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.4 Robot capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
CHAPTER 3 THE HELP ABSTRACTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.1 Throwing and handling help exceptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2 Libraries for handling help exceptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
CHAPTER 4 THE OBJECT ABSTRACTION . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
CHAPTER 5 THE HARDWARE ABSTRACTION . . . . . . . . . . 16
CHAPTER 6 THE INTERACTION ABSTRACTION . . . . . . . . 17
CHAPTER 7 SECURITY CONCEPTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
7.1 Threat model and assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
7.2 Identifying uers securely . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
7.3 Audit log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
CHAPTER 8 EVALUATION OF EXPERIMENTAL SYSTEMS . . . 30
8.1 Bartender app case study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
8.2 Design iterations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
8.3 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
8.4 Purchasing coffee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
8.5 User influence on factor effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
8.6 Adversarial analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
CHAPTER 9 RELATED WORKS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
CHAPTER 10 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
v
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Robots are an increasingly important part of society. Industrial robots
have been a staple of manufacturing facilities for decades, and in recent
years, military robots have seen increasing use. For example, in 2008 the U.S.
Air Force had twice as many robotic planes as manned planes [1]. People
use service robots for cleaning floors and carpets [2], mowing lawns [3], and
driving cars [4]. Household robots are used as pets [5], and in nursing homes
and for children’s rehabilitation [6]. Evidence shows that people bond with
all types of robots and accept service and household robots as a part of their
families [7, 8], suggesting a continued increase of robot use in the workplace
and in the home.
Although robots are purpose-built typically, we view robots as general
purpose computing devices that should be capable of running robot apps.
By running robot apps we do not mean running Emacs and gcc, but rather
robots should include a simple and general-purpose operating system (OS) for
controlling the robot itself. Our goal is to make robots as easy to program
as mobile phones, support multiple robot apps at the same time, and to
free robot app developers from having to know intimate details about the
hardware and software configuration of the robot. Although many of the
same systems techniques we use on more traditional computing environments
apply to robots as well (e.g., multiplexing devices), robots are fundamentally
different than traditional computer systems in interesting and novel ways.
Robot apps have to interact with the world and people around them with-
out the benefit of a well-defined interface. Mobile robot algorithms are fun-
damentally probabilistic [9, 10, 11], complicating tasks like identifying and
authenticating the people that interact with robots. Application logic that
could be simple instead becomes cluttered and full of control flow to deal
with this uncertainty. Variations in robot hardware or the capability of plat-
forms also complicates applications. Robot apps operate at a higher level of
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abstraction than general operating systems. Traditional applications oper-
ate on processes, files, sockets, and users, whereas robots apps will operate
on robots, people, walls, maps, locations, paths, and so on. Choosing the
correct abstractions will help robot apps interact with the real world.
In this paper, we describe Isaac, a robot we built, and Frak1, an OS we built
for simplifying app development on robots and for managing robot hardware.
Our key insight is that some tasks are too hard for apps to handle without
exceedingly complex software, so we introduce a “get help” abstraction to
handle unanticipated situations. The main mechanism in the “get help”
abstraction is a help exception. The Frak system throws help exceptions on
failed API calls, and the app writer can throw help exceptions explicitly when
it enters an unanticipated state. Frak tries to handle these exceptions in a
unreliable, but accurate, library first. If none of the libraries can handle the
exception, Frak notifies the user, who can take control of the robot and help
it proceed manually. By first using unreliable, but accurate, libraries and
then falling back to humans to solve complex tasks, we simplify app software
while still being able to do interesting and sophisticated tasks.
Our Frak OS includes abstractions for enabling app writers to write pro-
grams that operate on robot abstractions without having to know the exact
software and hardware configuration of the underlying robot system. We
have a general object abstraction for identifying people, places, and things,
and we built user and location abstractions on top of our object abstraction.
Frak also has abstractions for generating user interfaces that enable apps to
interact with users. These abstractions are independent of the underlying
hardware configuration and the Frak system adapts the software automati-
cally using whatever resources it has available.
To test Frak, we built 14 apps that we use on Isaac, and we deployed Isaac
in our office for real use. Our most comprehensive app is a bartender app,
which is an app for serving drinks during social events. In the bartender
app, Isaac travels to the student lounge, takes drink orders, brings the drink
orders back to the bartender, and then delivers the drinks to the person who
ordered them originally. Other apps include a “give our advisor a message”
app that runs in the background and tells a person something if the robot
sees that person in the hallway, and an app that delivers travel receipts to a
1Framework for Robot Applications, K?
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secretary and asks him or her (nicely) to submit them for reimbursement.
Our contributions are:
• We introduce the novel help abstraction for dealing with uncertainty
in robot applications.
• We designed and implemented a novel architecture for running robot
apps, including multiple apps concurrently.
• We built Frak and the associated abstractions, and a robot, Isaac, for
running experiments. We also built CLASS which provides engineers
and developers with secure, easy-to-use mechanisms for designing robot
applications that interact with people.
• We wrote a number of robot apps using CLASS and evaluated them
in real world conditions. This includes our main test app where our
robot buys and fetches a cup of coffee from our local coffee shop. We
evaluate these test apps experimentally.
• We define a novel algorithm for enabling robots to identify people,
and we introduce the first design principles and trade offs for choosing
features that robots can use to identify people, even in an adversarial
setting.
• We design and implement an audit logging system for our robot that
enables system builders to evaluate past security related decisions to
assess and debug any wrong moves.
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CHAPTER 2
FRAMEWORK FOR ROBOT
APPLICATIONS
This paper presents Frak, a system that provides writers of robot applica-
tions the ability to implement apps. Our primary goals are to make it easy to
write robot apps without exposing the underlying robot hardware or libraries
that drive the platform, while enabling multiple apps to run concurrently.
In this section, we discuss the design principles that guide our design, our
hardware architecture, and our software architecture.
2.1 Design principles
.
Our design is guided by the following principles:
1. Simple apps. Robot apps should be easy to write.
2. Hardware independence. App logic should not be concerned with im-
plementation details and hardware specifics.
3. Future proofing. Apps should automatically benefit from advances in
robot technology that occur.
2.2 Hardware architecture
When developing our hardware architecture our goal is to use as many
commodity components as possible. By using well-supported commodity
hardware, we hope to keep the cost low and to make programming easier.
To build Isaac, we use an iRobot Create, which is like a Roomba without
the vacuum and with a programmable interface, a netbook running Linux to
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Figure 2.1: Our robot, Isaac, includes an iRobot Create, a netbook, and a
Kinect.
handle most of our computation, and a Kinect for video and depth sensing
(Figure 2.1).
2.3 Software architecture
For our software architecture, we use a robot runtime system called ROS
[12, 13]. The basic ROS architecture resembles a microkernel architecture
where there is a thin software layer that is responsible for passing messages
between different processes (or ROS Nodes) that implement key functional-
ity (Figure 2.2). The ROS kernel exports a publish/subscribe interface to
facilitate communication between nodes. ROS also includes functionality for
basic robot abstractions, such as mapping, localization (where the robot is
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Figure 2.2: Our robot software. At the lowest layer is the OS and the basic
ROS kernel for implementing message passing and maintaining an audit
log. At the next layer is hardware-specific software that interacts with the
robot and sensing hardware, and the ROS nodes that implement low-level
robot abstractions. Frak is at the top layer, which implements abstractions
for apps and the help abstraction.
located currently on the map), path planning to determine how to navigate
the robot in the map, and robot locomotion.
Frak runs on top of ROS and we split Frak into two different layers: the
library layer and the application layer. In the library layer, libraries use ROS
functionality to implement higher-level functionality. Frak includes libraries
for managing applications, users, locations, objects, and user interfaces (UIs).
Frak also includes extensibility APIs for enabling application developers to
write their own libraries. At the application layer, applications use the ab-
stractions exported by the libraries.
In addition to the abstraction layers Frak implements, we also included
comprehensive audit logging capabilities throughout ROS and Frak. This
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audit log infrastructure records enough information at runtime to enable
system builders to recreate past states and events to help debug the system.
Our audit logging infrastructure takes advantage of the modular nature of
our architecture.
2.4 Robot capabilities
In this section, we will detail the capabilities of our robot as implemented.
We aimed to implement and use well tested algorithms. We have the under-
standing that other research will improve the capabilities of our robot with
time.
Isaac can navigate around the halls of our building with relative ease. Most
of the furniture inside of rooms is currently not on our maps. Isaac can avoid
such obstacles, but they do hinder it from accurately keeping track of its
location. Due to the inaccurate wheel odometry in our robot, we had to add
a gyro to aid in measuring rotation. Passerbys in the hallway can cause the
robot to move more cautiously (it spins around a lot to verify its position),
causing slowdown. We did not attempt SLAM (Simultaneous Location and
Mapping) as it was an unnecessary complication.
Using a relatively standard Haar classifier from OpenCV, Isaac is very
good at detecting faces. We discovered this algorithm was prone to false
positives, and were able to significantly reduce them by using the 3D infor-
mation provided by our Kinect. We rule out false positives that are too large
or small. We also check the geometry of the detected face to help rule out
flat objects like posters and photographs.
Isaac can speak in a suitably robotic generated voice, and is surprisingly
good at listening to spoken commands thanks to Google’s Automatic Speech
Recognition technology. Unfortunately, due to limitations in this technology,
it is unable to hear profanity.
2.4.1 Software
We implemented a GUI in QT that allows a user sitting at a PC to provide
responses to help exceptions. It has a dialog for identifying people where the
user is presented with a snapshot of the person and presented with options
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about who they are. It also has a dialog for finding the robot that allows
for full remote control, has a video feed, and displays a map so the user can
locate the robot. This GUI integrates with ROS and communicates with the
robot via ROS messaging and service calls.
To allow users with heterogeneous devices to interact with the robot, we
developed a web application interface. Frak provides a number of widgets
that applications can directly use to interact with the user - such as a Dia-
log for prompting questions, or AlertBoxes for notifying users. Application
developers are also given an API for defining plugins that can be registered
with the Frak web server. Plugins are written in Python, and can either use
existing HTML templates, or define custom ones. The remote user callbacks
are delivered to the running applications on the robot by the underlying
communication layer provided by ROS.
In addition to the apps discussed, we have implemented a number of useful
apps and test apps. We have a voice-based launcher that listens for the names
of our other apps and launches them, a ‘copycat’ audio mimic app to test
speech input/output (Though it usually ends up copying itself in a loop after
a while), and a number of simple navigation / robot control apps (drive in
circles, attempt to “parallel park” the robot, etc.
In addition to our improved face detection heuristics, we have a number
of nodes for identifying users based on other characteristics. We can identify
and remember shirt color and user height (when standing).
We use a MySQL database to store all of our objects and allow for per-
sistence. If we update user information during one run (noting a new recent
location, for example), or record a location, that information is saved and
made available to all the apps. This way, Isaac has learned many people/lo-
cations in our building without us having to manually create a list.
We have a very thorough logging infrastructure built in to our system.
We log all messages published to all topics, all ROS service calls that are
made, and all results returned by them. This required a few changes to
the underlying ROS architecture, but gives us a great deal of flexibility in
debugging our software.
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2.4.2 Performance
Isaac uses an ASUS 1215N netbook with an 1.8ghz Intel Atom D525 CPU.
This is a dual core model, and during operation it is 90% utilized. The largest
consumers of processing power are the Kinect video processing node (using
52%) and the localization and navigation routines (using 31%).
We ran the Kinect off of the iRobot Create’s power supply. As a whole,
Isaac could operate for 68 minutes without requiring recharging (longer if it
wasn’t driving around much).
It took the robot on average 133 seconds to travel from the lounge to the
bar, a distance of about 112 feet (about .25 m/s).
Due largely to all the processing we did with the video stream, we averaged
23.4MB/s of bandwidth usage between ROS nodes during execution. These
nodes were all on the same machine, however. In order to pipe the video feed
to the remote GUI, we had to encode it with Ogg Theora and downsample
the resolution significantly which reduced it to 70KB/s of bandwidth usage.
9
CHAPTER 3
THE HELP ABSTRACTION
One difficulty in programming robots is that they operate in unknown
environments. Some algorithms are designed specifically to deal with this
type of noise and work quite well, like localization algorithms that enable a
robot to determine where it is located within a known map. Other algorithms
become overwhelmed by the noise and have difficulty accomplishing their
specified task, like identifying a person in a crowded room. In addition,
robots can be limited by their hardware and might be unable to accomplish
common tasks. For example, a short robot will be unable to press the down
button on an elevator or to open a closed door.
One way to cope with these types of unknown environments is to write
software that is more complex. However, enumerating through all possible
scenarios a robot might encounter is difficult, and even if the app writer is
able to anticipate all possible changes to the environment, some robots will
still be unable to carry out some tasks.
In this section, we introduce the help abstraction to make dealing with
uncertainty in robot apps easier by falling back to unreliable, but accurate,
libraries, and falling back to users in difficult situations. The help abstraction
includes exceptions that Frak throws when it encounters a failed API call,
and exceptions that the app writer can throw explicitly when the app enters
an unanticipated state. Exceptions that Frak throws can be caught by a
library or by the app. Uncaught Frak exceptions and exceptions that the
app writer throws explicitly are passed to a person who can assist the robot
and help it make progress manually.
In our current implementation, Frak has four types of help exceptions.
First, Frak can throw a user not found exception that signifies that the user
manager was unable to locate a user. Second, Frak can throw a robot lost
exception that signifies that the robot is uncertain about where it is located
currently. Third, Frak can throw a robot stuck exception that signifies that
10
Figure 3.1: UI for the robot lost help exception. If a robot lost
exception makes it up to the user Frak displays this UI to enable users to
help the robot figure out where it is. This figure includes a live video
stream from the robot, controls for moving the robot, and a map that the
user can click on to specify where the robot is located currently.
the robot cannot continue to follow its current path. Fourth, the app writer
can throw an app help exception that is specific to an app and goes directly
to a human user. This app-specific exception includes information specified
by the programmer to convey to the user what type of help the app needs.
3.1 Throwing and handling help exceptions
When Frak throws a help exception, libraries have the first opportunity
to handle the exception. In Frak, all libraries can register for notification of
help exceptions and they can try to handle them before notifying the app.
The libraries that try to handle the exception pass back information about
the specific exception. This return value is a specific person in an image for
the user not found exception, a location on the map for the robot lost
exception, or a new path plan for a robot stuck exception. Library replies
also include a confidence metric, which indicates to Frak how likely the library
thinks its answer is. Frak uses this confidence metric to decide which solution
to use.
If no libraries handle the exception, then Frak passes it along to the app
and then the user. App developers can handle exceptions using traditional
exception handling mechanisms and can react appropriately for the specific
application. If the app does not handle the exception, Frak notifies the user
and gives them manual control of the robot. The user can then navigate the
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Figure 3.2: Help exception handling. This figure shows an app that tries to
drive to Bob, but Isaac cannot find him. As a result, Frak throws an
user not found exception, which eventually is sent to the user.
robot using their keyboard, pick a user, set a new path, or do whatever they
want using the manual control mechanisms available in our system. Figure
3.1 shows the UI screen that the robot displays in response to robot lost
exceptions.
Figure 3.2 shows an example of how Frak handles a user not found excep-
tion. In this example, (1) the app issues a drive to command to tell Isaac to
drive to Bob. Then, (2) Isaac cannot find Bob and throws a user not found
exception. Frak (3) broadcasts the user not found exception, and when
none of the libraries handles it, (4) sends the exception to the user. The user
is given a picture of Bob and a live video stream from Isaac, and the user
is asked to identify Bob manually. At this point, the user has full control of
Isaac and can move him around, turn on the speakers to talk, or do anything
else he or she wants to try to find Bob.
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Help topic Library
user not found Identify people based on
height and shirt color
robot lost Look for known land-
marks (e.g., room num-
bers)
robot stuck Knock on door by run-
ning into it a few times
Figure 3.3: Frak libraries for handling help exceptions.
3.2 Libraries for handling help exceptions
In general, we use the most reliable libraries for handling our basic func-
tionality, and unreliable, but accurate, libraries for handling exceptions. Dur-
ing normal operation, we identify users using a facial recognition algorithm
from the OpenCV vision library, and for localization, we use the state-of-
the-art Monte Carlo localization algorithm [11] with hand-tuned parameters
specific to our particular hardware and configuration. These algorithms are
always available when the robot is running and are the primary way that
Isaac identifies users and determines where he is located at any given time.
Figure 3.3 shows the libraries that we built to handle help exceptions. Our
user not found library tries to detect people based off their height and the
color of their shirt. For above average height men wearing gray, this library
will not work well, but if we are looking for an abnormally tall person who
is wearing pink, it might work. Our robot lost library tries to determine
location based on performing optical character recognition on room numbers,
which only works when the robot can see a room number. Our robot stuck
library tries to knock on a closed door, which is great if someone is in a closed
office, but is of little help for entering an elevator. None of these libraries
would work well as a first-class library because there are many scenarios
when they are unable to provide meaningful information. However, there are
situations where these libraries could provide accurate information, enabling
Frak to avoid passing help exceptions up to users.
When a library handles a help exception, Frak gives the library full control
of the robot. This level of control gives the library the ability to move or
actuate the robot to try to gain more information or accomplish the task, or
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to gather additional data from sensors. Although this level of control provides
a rich execution environment for libraries, it does present a potential safety
liability if a library becomes malicious.
14
CHAPTER 4
THE OBJECT ABSTRACTION
In Frak, we have a general notion of an object, which Frak uses to represent
nouns (people, places, and things). Apps tag objects with application-specific
information and in our current implementation we focus on two key objects:
users and locations. Users are the people who interact with the robot and
locations are the places that it might visit. These abstractions are used
both by apps and by libraries that implement the services that apps use. As
we continue to develop more apps, we expect to introduce a wider range of
objects.
Objects in Frak are global to all apps, and apps share labels and semantic
information for objects. For example, if one app labels a location, then other
apps can refer to that location using the same label. This type of sharing
should help users build up descriptions of objects quickly.
Users and locations. Users represent the people that the robot interacts
with. Users can be ephemeral or permanent, and they can be named or
anonymous. Locations are defined by coordinates in a map. Each time an
app encounters a user, Frak keeps track of the location of the user. This
information enables apps to do things like identify a user, fetch a drink for
that user, and bring the drink back to them. This information also enables
apps to identify a user opportunistically and to deliver them a message. By
associating locations with users, apps can navigate the robot based on this
information by specifying commands like “navigate to Bob based on his most
recent location” or “navigate to Bob based on where you usually see him at
this time of day.”
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CHAPTER 5
THE HARDWARE ABSTRACTION
In Frak, we model robot hardware in two different categories: sensors
and actuators. Sensors include odometry readings, audio and video streams,
gyroscopes, and any other devices the robot might use to observe the environ-
ment. Handling sensors in Frak is straightforward because they are read-only
effectively, thus any libraries and apps that wish to access sensor data are
allowed to.
Actuators are devices that the robot uses to move or otherwise manipulate
the environment. Because apps might have vastly different uses for actuators,
fine-grained multiplexing does not make sense for a robot. Instead, Frak im-
plements a basic cooperative scheduling policy for these resources. Libraries
and apps can grab control of an actuator using an interruptible lock that
allows other libraries and apps to control the resource if they request it, or
using an exclusive lock that gives the library or app uninterruptible control
over the resource. Requests made to a locked actuator are queued until the
node that holds the lock puts it back into the interruptible mode or releases
it.
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CHAPTER 6
THE INTERACTION ABSTRACTION
The human-machine interaction in contemporary computer systems – such
as PCs and smartphones, has been well studied with programming interface
and abstractions clearly defined at this layer. Unfortunately, in the robotics
domain the human-robot interaction has not been modeled as well. The pri-
mary challenge in designing a UI for Frak is that the I/O capabilities are
dictated by the underlying robot hardware and non-uniform across different
robot systems. Robot apps can interact with people in any number of ways,
including through a network-connected computer, audio I/O, video I/O, in-
frared light, or any other I/O technology, depending on the hardware present
on the robot.
To compensate for diverse hardware configurations, Frak encapsulates the
underlying hardware specifics of the robot by providing a high-level API for
interacting with the user. Frak supports speak, listen, ask, user.speak,
user.listen and user.ask where speak calls output text, and listen calls
wait for a user to input text, and ask calls ask a question and wait for a reply.
The ask function also takes an optional array of choices if the app asks a
multiple-choice question. The user versions of these calls direct the UI to a
specific user and the anonymous calls act independent of users. Frak maps
these calls to the appropriate hardware for the robot it is running on. Frak
also includes a user.robot status call that displays a map, marking where
the robot currently is on the map, and an application-specific status message
to let a user know the status of the app. For example, after a user orders a
drink, the bartender app uses the user.robot status UI to let users know
where the robot is and the status of their drink order.
On Isaac, Frak uses three different types of user interfaces. First, for apps
that interact with users via a network-connected computer, like a mobile
phone, Frak uses an embedded web server and a web app to interact with
the user. Isaac has a QR code (2D bar code) attached to him that users
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can use to get a URL for the web interface. Frak’s web interface utilizes a
micro-framework named Flask and the jQuery Mobile-based UI to interact
with the user. Each user has a mailbox that coresponds to her communication
channel with Isaac. The user is presented with a clean interface that prompts
them for input, or let’s them know of the status of any outstanding tasks.
Second, Frak uses the speakers and a text-to-speech library to communicate
with users over conventional audio interface. To convert spoken words to
utterances we have developed va library that utilizes Google speech-to-text
online API. Third, Frak includes a command-line interface with additional
GUI programs for power users that prefer to ssh into Isaac.
18
Figure 6.1: Our web-UI, prompting the user to select a drink.
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CHAPTER 7
SECURITY CONCEPTS
7.1 Threat model and assumptions
This paper addresses the issue of providing security mechanisms for ap-
plications that run on mobile robots. We focus on developing mechanisms
that enable robots to identify people robustly, and providing an audit log for
forensic analysis.
We trust the layers upon which the CLASS software is built. This trust in-
cludes the OS and libraries used to control the robot, and the robot hardware
itself. Fortifying the hardware and software layers upon which the robot sys-
tem is built is an important and interesting topic, but it is a complementary
issue to designing algorithms and systems for providing security services for
robot applications.
CLASS is designed to operate under malicious influence. We consider
attacks that originate from an attacker interacting with the robot in a way
that tries to impersonate another user.
7.2 Identifying uers securely
Overall, CLASS uses sensor readings from as many different sensors as pos-
sible to provide a more broad and redundant view of the physical properties
of the environment. Then based on these sensor readings, CLASS derives a
wide range of features that describe the people that it detects, such as their
location, shirt color, or height. Using these features CLASS develops metrics
for positively identifying users (i.e., is this a particular user) and metrics
for negatively identifying users (i.e., is this not a particular user). With
these basic metrics CLASS combines them in a reasonable way to assess its
20
confidence in user identification given the current set of sensor readings.
The fundamental challenges in this style of user identification are picking
meaningful features, combining them in a way that can withstand some level
of attack, and deciding when to fall back to a more explicit authentication
technique when needed.
In this section we discuss the CLASS system for identifying users. We
first discuss the CLASS API (Section 7.2.1), and the trade offs one can make
when selecting features to use for identification in general (Section 7.2.2).
Next we describe the specific features we use for our robot (Section 7.2.3).
Then we introduce our algorithm for using these features to identify users
automatically (Section 7.2.4).
7.2.1 CLASS API
From a high level, the CLASS API enables applications to compare a
detected person to an earlier reading or to determine if there is a known
user who matches the person it has detected. The CLASS node reads in
robot specific data to extract features of people when they are detected and
notifies the application when the robot encounters a person. The application
can then query the CLASS identification node to determine if this person is
the same person that the robot encountered at some point in the past.
The key of our API is that the application does not need to know any of
the platform specific attributes of the robot and it does not need to know
which features the CLASS node uses to match people. The application does
have to remember key people (e.g., a user who orders a cup of coffee) so it
can use this later to determine if the robot encounters the same person in
the future.
When the application queries the CLASS node about identification, it can
ask the CLASS node to return the most likely person and an associated
confidence level for this match, or it can ask the CLASS node to compare
two people and return a confidence level of the match. The application can
interpret this confidence level however it sees fit for the particular application.
In general, the application controls the movements and hardware on the
robot, but if the application wants to try to gain higher confidence about
two people matching, it can delegate some of its control capabilities to the
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Figure 7.1: Overview of how CLASS interacts with applications and other
modules on the system. Oval nodes represent event handling nodes and
square nodes represent service nodes that answer queries.
CLASS node. The CLASS node can then interact with the robot or the user
to try to gain higher confidence. For example, to gain higher confidence the
application can delegate control of the speakers to the CLASS node and the
CLASS node can ask the person to turn on their cell phone to try to obtain
a Bluetooth signal that is known to be associated with a specific person.
Figure 7.1 show an overview how the CLASS node interacts with the sys-
tem and with applications. As the system runs, (1) the Kinect driver will
pass images and depth sensor readings to a people detection algorithm, (2)
which will notify the CLASS node each time it detects a person. When this
happens, it will pass the image, depth sensor readings, and face location
information to the CLASS node. When the CLASS node receives this no-
tification, (3) it queries a set of features to try to detect information about
the person that it found, (4) and then notifies the application that it has
detected a person. The CLASS node will include all of the features in this
message, but the application can treat these as an opaque data structure
without having to understand the details of individual features or even what
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features the CLASS node uses. After the application receives notification of
a person, (5) it can query the CLASS node to see if it has a match or (6) ask
the CLASS node to try to gain more confidence if needed.
As the robot runs it maintains a history of features seen in a particular
environment. Using this history, the robot updates its calculations for com-
paring features based on the types of features that it observes. History affects
each feature differently and it is up to the discretion of the robot designer to
determine how to include the history in the calculations.
7.2.2 Selecting features
Our goal is to select a set of features that are suitable for identifying users
automatically. CLASS also must be able to know how confident it is about
a particular measurement so it can fall back to explicit authentication if it is
unable to identify a person with high confidence.
When selecting features, we consider the following properties of the fea-
tures when deciding whether to include them in our identification algorithm:
• Ability to identify someone positively.
• Ability to identify someone negatively.
• Difficulty of spoofing by an adversary.
We took some inspiration from the way that people might identify each
other. For example, if we see someone sitting at a desk, we might assume
(with low confidence) that it is the desk’s owner until we have some better
indication. Likewise, we have had success using location as one of the features
that CLASS considers.
In general having more features makes the identification algorithm more
robust against attacks on individual features, and system builders should
strive to have multiple features that perform well for each of the properties.
For example, having only features that can identify people positively and
negatively but are spoofed easily will be problematic in an adversarial setting.
Likewise, having only features that are robust against spoofing but are unable
to identify people positively will be hard to attack but unable to identify
people, which is the whole point of this mechanism.
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Identify Identify Hard to
positively negatively spoof
Location
√ √
+
Shirt color
√
+ −
Height − + √−
Bluetooth +
√ √
Figure 7.2: Properties of the features we use for identifying people. This
figure shows how well each of the features we use performs for the
properties related to identifying users. Higher ratings mean that a feature
performs better for a given property.
7.2.3 Our current features
The features that system builders use will depend heavily on the platform
they are using and the hardware and software capabilities available to them.
This section discusses the features we use in our system. These features are
not meant to be a definitive list of features for identifying users, but rather
to serve as an example of the features we found useful for our platform and
application.
The sensors available on our robot platform include wheel velocity com-
mands (which roboticists model as sensors), robot odometry measurements
(based on optical encoders that measure wheel rotation), and proximity sen-
sors. We use a Kinect on our robot, so our platform also senses video streams
and can associate distances from the robot with each pixel in the video using
an infrared depth sensor array.
As a base feature our system must detect people. To detect people we use
the face detection algorithm available in the OpenCV library [14]. By using
the depth information from the Kinect, we significantly reduce the likelihood
of false positives. This algorithm does not detect individual faces, but rather
finds faces present in an image.
Using our sensors, we calculate four key features that we use for identifying
users: location, shirt color, height, and Bluetooth signal strength. Figure 7.2
summarizes how well these features perform on each of the key properties we
describe in Section 7.2.2.
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Location
The first feature we discuss is the person’s location. The key aspect of
determining a person’s location is determining the robot’s location and mea-
suring where a person is relative to the robot using the depth sensor.
To determine our robot’s location we us the Monte Carlo Localization
(MCL) algorithm [11]. In robotics, localization refers to the calculation of
where a robot is located currently. Localization combines wheel velocity com-
mands with odometry measurements to develop a probabilistic hypothesis of
how far the robot has moved since the last known location. However, this
estimation tends to be noisy for mobile robots, so the MCL algorithm uses
depth sensor readings to gain more confidence as to where it currently is. As
the depth sensor detects objects (usually walls) the MCL algorithm can gain
more confidence as to where a robot is located within a building, assuming
that the map of the building is known ahead of time. The MCL algorithm
combines these sensor readings based on Bayesian calculations, and develops
high confidence about the location. This basic algorithm is used widely in
mobile robots and has been used successfully to perform localization on a
tour-guide robot in the Smithsonian museum [10].
The reason we use the MCL algorithm for localization is because it main-
tains thousands of distinct hypotheses about the robot’s location concur-
rently. If the some of the hypotheses are incorrect, the algorithm will reject
these hypotheses dynamically and weight more heavily higher confidence hy-
potheses, making this algorithm robust in noisy environments.
Location can be a suitable feature for positively and negatively identifying
a person for applications where a user should be in a well-known place. For
example, if a user orders a cup of coffee, they are likely to be in the same
location when the robot returns with the coffee. However, for crowded spaces
or an application where a user is moving around often location may not
perform as well. Location is difficult to spoof because the MCL algorithm
we use was designed specifically to adapt even in an adversarial setting (see
the “Kidnapped Robot Problem”) where the robot can recover from large
and undetected changes in location.
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Shirt color
The second feature we discuss is the color of a person’s shirt. To calculate
a person’s shirt color we calculate a 2D histogram of the hues and saturations
of colors we find in a 10cm x 10cm square 30 cm below the center of their
face.
If the robot has already seen a person and they are trying to find them
again, their shirt color is a moderately accurate feature for positively iden-
tifying people. Of course many people wear the same color shirts, so this
metric is not perfect, but it can help identify people to a limited degree.
However, if a robot is trying to find the same person again and they have a
different color shirt, this can be a fairly good indication that this is not the
person they are looking for. Unfortunately, shirt color is straightforward for
attackers to spoof.
Height
The third feature we discuss is a person’s height. To calculate a person’s
height we can measure the distance from the top of their face to the floor
using the video stream and depth sensors.
Because people are average height on average, height is usually not dis-
tinctive. However, if a person is unusually tall (like both of the authors)
or if their height differs drastically from previous readings, it can be used
to provide some confidence about positive or negative identification. Height
can be spoofed by a small amount fairly easily, but large changes in height
can be more difficult to spoof inconspicuously (e.g., an attacker is unlikely
to walk around with stilts and navigate through a building unnoticed).
Bluetooth signal strength
The fourth feature we discuss is the strength of a person’s cell phone Blue-
tooth signal. We assume that a user would be willing to pair their phone
to the robot once so that the robot can detect the signal strength of the
Bluetooth signal to determine if the person (or at least their cell phone) is
near by.
Bluetooth signal strength can be a good indicator for positive identification
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1 F = getFeatureProabilities(PersonA, PersonB);
2
3 // calculate aggregate positive identification prob.
4 total_p = 0;
5 foreach pos in F
6 total_p += (pos*(1-total_p));
7
8 // calculate aggregate negative identification prob.
9 total_n = 0;
10 foreach neg in F
11 total_n += (neg*(1-total_n));
12
13 // combine two metrics
14 if(total_n > total_p)
15 return 0;
16 return total_p - total_n;
Figure 7.3: Algorithm for determining the confidence level of two people
being the same person. Lower confidence levels indicate that two people are
unlikely to be the same person and higher confidence levels indicate that
two people are likely to be the same person.
because it shows that the person is likely to be close by. There are many
reasons a person might not have a strong Bluetooth signal even if they are
close by, such as turning off Bluetooth on their phone or leaving their phone
behind, so it can be a poor feature for negative identification, but could still
be suitable for some users (i.e., someone who leaves Bluetooth on and always
has their phone on them). Because we pair Bluetooth devices, spoofing the
Bluetooth ID is difficult, but an attacker could potentially steal one’s phone
or use a signal repeater to boost the strength of a Bluetooth signal when the
phone is far away.
7.2.4 The CLASS identification algorithm
Figure 7.3 shows the algorithm we use for calculating our confidence that
two people are the same person. The CLASS identification algorithm is de-
signed around a number of desired properties. It is capable of combining
many different features together through a common formula, and generally
the more well-written features that you have, the better your results will be.
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Even with only features that return low-confidence results, a sufficient num-
ber of them can be combined to form a reasonably confident identification.
Each factor returns both a positive identification confidence level and a neg-
ative identification confidence level. Again, it is important to remember that
negative identification means that the compared people are not the same -
it is not the same as being unsure. The algorithm is heavily biased towards
non-identification. If there is sufficient indicators of negative identification,
then it will never return high confidence of identification. This helps make
it very resistant to attack: even if an adversary successfully fools all of our
other factors, if he is inexplicably four inches too short we will not return a
confident positive identification.
7.3 Audit log
Due to the inherently probabilistic nature of many algorithms in robotics,
mistakes are inevitable. Even when CLASS thinks it has a 95% confidence
in its results, it is not perfect. Thus, it is important that CLASS be able
to both learn from its mistakes and store enough information to understand
what happened.
7.3.1 Design
The majority of the features that we have implemented or considered rely
heavily on the historical probability of events occurring. They need to ask
questions like “how often does this person change their clothing in the middle
of the day?” or “how often is the height of a person reported incorrectly
by more than two inches?” If we restrict ourselves to storing the sensor
information that was used by the various factors (for example, an image of
every time a person was detected - but not the full video stream), a full
year’s data would take up less than 2 TB of space. For security, the audit
log should be stored remotely anyways, and this much space is not going to
be a problem.
Additionally, it is important to store as much data as possible about re-
cent events. To this end, we record sufficient information to recreate the
entire state of our system for the past 48 hours. This includes all the sen-
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sor messages broadcast by the sensors, the actual inputs (including full video
streams) into the sensors, the decisions that the application made, etc. Based
on some simple experiments, we determine that this detailed audit log would
occupy less than 1 TB of space. Again, we do not see storing this data to be
a significant hardship.
7.3.2 Implementation
The implementation of this audit log was very easy. The robot runtime
system that we choose, ROS, contains full record/replay functionality for it’s
inter-node communication. We simply setup ‘rosbag’ to store all published
messages for the last 48 hours, allowing us to replay and examine the state
of the system at any time.
Additionally, we choose to create a database of sensor readings and results
that would be used by the factors, such that we could easily aggregate im-
portant information and store it for a longer period of time. This database
provides the data to properly calibrate and weight the many inputs.
7.3.3 Retrospection
Using the audit log, earlier decisions can be automatically replayed using
the information that the robot did not know until afterward. This allows for
an application to double check the decisions that it made earlier in the day
and alert the user if any potential mistakes have occurred.
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CHAPTER 8
EVALUATION OF EXPERIMENTAL
SYSTEMS
8.1 Bartender app case study
Our bartender app breaks the task of serving drinks down in to four main
steps: taking orders, returning to the bar, acquiring the correct drinks, and
giving the orders back to the correct people. Figure 8.1 shows the source
code for our bartender app. To evaluate this app, we ran it 10 times where
we had one of the author’s group members in a lounge and another memberr
serving as the bartender. We ran these experiments during normal business
hours with people walking around Isaac as he ran the app.
To take drink orders, Isaac looks up the location of the lounge in its
database of locations and drives there. In 9/10 runs, it drives there on
its own without issue, but during one it got lost and had to issue a get help
call.
Once it reaches the lounge, it uses face detection to find a new user. Seven
out of ten times it successfully finds a person, but the rest are false positives
in the face detection module. get help is again used, this time to verify the
identity of the user. If the user is known to have a smartphone, Frak can
use the web user interface to ask them their drink order. Otherwise, it has
to communicate with the speaker and speech recognition nodes. These steps
are very reliable.
Returning to the bar was accomplished on every run without issue. Isaac
then reads the drink orders to the bartender, waits, and drives back to the
users. In our trials, we had the users remain in the same area as they were
when previously found, so Isaac was able to be locate them easily.
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class Bartender(frak.App):
orders = {}
users = None
def on_start(self):
# Let's assume the robot starts lost
get_help(robot_lost)
self.bartender ()
def bartender(self):
while not rospy.is_shutdown ():
take_order ()
return_to_bar ()
acquire_drinks ()
give_order ()
def take_order ():
# Drive to the student lounge
navigation.get_location_by_name("lounge"). drive_to ()
bob = user_manager.find_new_user ()
order = bob.ask("What would you like to drink?",
["Sprite", "Coke"])
orders[bob.name] = order.result ()
bob.robot_status ()
def return_to_bar ():
bar = navigation.get_location_by_name("bar")
bar.drive_to ()
def acquire_drinks(orders ):
speak("Hello , bartender. I need these drinks.")
for order in orders:
speak(order)
listen ()
speak("Thanks.")
def give_order ():
for username ,order in orders.iteritems ():
user = user_manager.get_user_by_name(username)
user.drive_to ()
user.speak("Hello %s, here is your %s" %
(username , order ))
user.listen ()
del orders[username]
if __name__ == '__main__ ':
try:
app = Bartender ()
app.run()
except rospy.ROSInterruptException: pass
Figure 8.1: Code listing for our bartender app.
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Height Bluetooth Shirt Location Confidence
Baseline 10 80 70 50 97.3%
Sitting 0 80 70 50 97.0%
Cell phone off 10 0 70 50 86.5%
Different shirt 10 80 0 50 91.0%
In hallway 10 80 70 0 94.6%
Figure 8.2: Results of experiment for testing CLASS’s ability to identify
Alice in various situations.
8.2 Design iterations
During evaluation, we had to debug and change a few things in our design
that we had not considered originally.
We initially found it troublesome initializing the localization module of
our robot. While it can perform global localization (locating itself in the
building without knowing where it started at), doing so takes a long time
and involves a significant amount of driving. For a while, we would use
the ROS Visualization package to inform Frak where it was, but this was
cumbersome. We found it much simpler to just assume that the robot is lost
when it powers on and issue a get help(‘find robot’) call.
Due to the short stature of our robot, we had trouble with identifying
users. When a user was standing in front of Isaac, it would only be able to
see their shins. We had to adjust the find new user API to tilt the Kinect
upwards using its motors.
We also found that if the Kinect wasn’t pointed slightly upwards during
travel it would occasionally register the ground in front of the robot as an
obstacle and then attempt to avoid it, slowing down Isaac significantly.
In a related issue, reflections would occasionally cause the Kinect to return
noisy data, which caused our robot to slow down until it was able to have
high confidence about its localization information. One change we plan to
make in future versions is to set up preferred paths for our robot to avoid
these slow hallways.
This section describes our evaluation of the CLASS system. In our evalua-
tion we measure: (1) a realistic application, (2) how well CLASS can identify
users, and (3) how well CLASS can withstand an attacker who tries to im-
personate a legitimate user.
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Height Bluetooth Shirt Location Confidence
Baseline 55 40 12 20 81.0%
Sitting 0 40 12 20 57.8%
Cell phone off 55 0 12 20 63.3%
Different shirt 55 40 0 20 78.4%
In hallway 55 40 12 0 76.2%
Figure 8.3: Results of experiment for testing CLASS’s ability to identify
Bob in various situations.
8.3 Methodology
To evaluate CLASS’s ability to identify users we implemented the CLASS
system on our robot and ran a series of experiments. In our first set of
experiments we wrote an application for purchasing coffee on behalf of a user.
In our second set of experiments focus on the specific task of identifying a
user where we start with a baseline measurement that includes all features,
then we intentionally perturb each of the four features and we compare the
two measurements to see if they still match. To perturb height, we sat
down, preventing our robot from calculating the user’s height. To perturb
Bluetooth, we turned off our cell phone. To perturb shirt color, we changed
shirts. To perturb location, we moved out of the office and into the hallway.
After each of these perturbations we ran the identification algorithm and
report how confident the CLASS algorithm was that the user was a match.
In our third set of experiments we tested the robot with an adversarial user.
This adversary was able to match all of the features of the real user except
for one.
For our hardware, we used an iRobot Create as the base, an ASUS Eee
PC 1015PEM netbook to run the software, and a Kinect. We had to assem-
ble a power regulator to connect the Kinect to the iRobot’s power supply,
and we machined a mounting plate to hold it all together1. For the soft-
ware, we used the latest distribution of ROS, ‘diamondback’. We wrote our
own iRobot driver for ROS, ‘irobot create illinois’, which should be avail-
able online soon. We used the OpenNI Kinect drivers, and Willow Garage’s
‘pointcloud to laserscan’ node to generate the depth sensor readings for ROS’s
amcl navigation modules. We wrote a simple map server that provided an
1Construction documented at http://murph.cc/isaac
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occupancy map of our building, and used the ‘rviz’ tool to provide initial
pos estimates. Our face detection code comes directly from OpenCV and we
wrote our own ‘shirt color detector’ service that did the necessary process-
ing. Our audit logging node used a MySQL database to store the long-term
history of the robot’s observations, and the ‘rosbag’ utility to store the in
detail full system state for the short term. The CLASS algorithm itself was
implemented in python as a ROS Service, and a second ROS node was cre-
ated for the Coffee application. That node was responsible for providing the
overall direction to the rest of the robot (drive to location A, locate person
B, etc). We used eSpeak 1.44.04 to provide text-to-speech capability to the
robot, and implemented a text-based command protocol to issue commands
to the Coffee application via ROS messages. Bluetooth support was a simple
wrapper around ’hcitool’ that checked for paired devices and read their signal
to noise ratio to estimate distance.
8.4 Purchasing coffee
To evaluate the CLASS system, we designed an example application that
required the robot to purchase coffee from the nearby coffee shop and then
bring it back to the person that ordered it. This required it to identify the
person who originally ordered the coffee, and to then identify the same person
when it returned. Additionally, it had to avoid misidentifying anyone else
that it found as that person. We will skip some details of the implementation
(how someone expresses the order, path planning to the coffee shop and back,
interactions with the shop) and focus on the parts related to CLASS.
We’re going to step through the steps that our robot, Isaac, had to take
to buy coffee for the user, Murph.
8.4.1 The user
Murph (the author of this paper) is a graduate student that has a messy
desk in an office shared with other students. Isaac has had several days to
observe Murph’s habits: how frequently he kept his cell phone on him, how
tall he is, how likely he was to be sitting at his desk at any given time, etc.
Since we knew the user so well, we supplemented Isaac’s knowledge a bit to
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reduce the learning period (e.g., we informed him what color shirts Murph
wears). You could say he knew the user reasonably well. However, he had
yet to see Murph this day.
8.4.2 Initial order
When the user placed his order, the robot needed to successfully identify
him such that it could recognize him again in the future. In this case, Isaac
took a good look at the user and decided that it recognized him to 79%
confidence. This was a bit low because the robot had not yet encountered
the user on that day and was unaware of what he was wearing. Additionally,
Isaac was unable to get a good height measurement since the user was sitting
down. Much of the confidence came from the proximity of the user’s cellphone
(via Bluetooth) and the low likelihood that anyone else would be sitting in
that desk. However, 79% is still reasonably high and the application was
satisfied that it knew who the user was.
8.4.3 The return
After purchasing the coffee, Isaac headed back towards the user’s office.
Along the way, he saw a person in the hallway that, through coincidence, was
wearing the same color of shirt as the user, and was equally tall. Even though
those two factors return a high likelihood of identifying the user, there were
negative indications due to the lack of the user’s Bluetooth signal (recently
observed to be near him), and the unusual location. Overall, CLASS returned
a 29.5% confidence that this was the user. This confidence percentage was
much too low, so the robot continued on.
8.4.4 The return, part 2
Returning to the user’s desk, Isaac had no trouble recognizing him. He
had seen the user at this location a few minutes earlier, so it was likely that
he would find the user here again. He was able to find the user’s phone
via Bluetooth, and this time Isaac was able to gain additional confidence in
his identification by confirming that the user’s shirt matched what he’d seen
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earlier. CLASS returned a 88.7% confidence, and the application happily
handed over the coffee.
8.5 User influence on factor effectiveness
The effectiveness of each factor varies from one user to another. The
better a factor correlated to something outstanding about the user, the more
confidently it could identify him. Unfortunately, recording the habits of a
bunch of CS grad students does not demonstrate this well, so let’s imagine
two very different users and compare how well CLASS can identify them.
We give them hypothetical histories (locations, clothing worn, etc.) that
demonstrate possible users.
To test how well CLASS can identify these users, we load these hypo-
thetical histories into CLASS and use the robot to measure how well it can
identify a real user with these hypothetical histories.
Our first user, Alice, has her own office and keeps to herself in it. She is of
average height, never lets her cell phone out of her sight, and always wears
bright pink outfits (which would really stand out in the computer science
department). As you can see in Figure 8.2, CLASS can confidently identify
Alice even in situations where a particular factor might be unreliable. If
someone is in her office, CLASS can be somewhat confident that it is her. If
someone is wearing bright pink, it’s bound to be Alice.
Now, let’s look at our second hypothetical user, Bob. Bob tends to blend
in a bit more than Alice. He does most of his work in a community area,
and tends to wear grey. He’s unusually short, and loses his phone at least
once a week. As you can see in Figure 8.3, it’s much harder to identify Bob.
With a perfect measurement, CLASS still can only achieve 81% confidence
that it recognizes him. His unusual height helps out a lot – but it’s not at
all unusual for him to be sitting down and thus preventing his height from
being measured – and then the confidence drops to 57.8% which is quite low.
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Experiment Confidence
Too short 46%
Wrong phone 35%
Wrong shirt 29%
Wrong location 92%
Figure 8.4: Results of experiment for testing CLASS’s ability to withstand
an adversary who is spoofing all of the features of a user except for one.
8.6 Adversarial analysis
CLASS is designed to resist attacks by allowing a single strong negative
identification to reduce the confidence level of it’s results. For our adversarial
analysis, we return to our original user – the overworked grad student who
just wants his coffee but is too busy to get it himself. We adopt a very strong
threat model – our adversary can perfectly mimic the user except for a single
one of the factors.
Figure 8.4 shows the confidence measurements that were returned when
our adversary attempted to claim the coffee in each possible situation. As
you can see, a single reasonably strong negative identification was enough to
prevent him from stealing the user’s coffee for three of the four features. The
only exception to this was location – our robot, on its own, cannot completely
call out the adversary based on location. If it were able to communicate with
another trusted robot or source, it might be able to (it could determine that
the real user was last seen far away recently, which would be a strong negative
indication).
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CHAPTER 9
RELATED WORKS
We divide our discussion of related work into four main categories: robot
operating systems, robot apps, robot programming, and operating systems.
The most closely related work is ROS [12, 13], which is an operating system
for robots that runs on top of Linux. ROS uses a microkernel architecture
and focuses on message-passing mechanisms for combining different robot
subsystems together. ROS defines a set of low-level robot abstractions, such
as point clouds and paths, that one can use to program a robot. Frak is
built on top of ROS and reuses the basic architecture and message passing
facilities (Frak libraries and apps are ROS nodes), but in Frak we focus on
abstractions for robot apps and abstractions for combining libraries together
when the robot encounters an unanticipated situation. Frak also focuses
on mechanisms and policies for running multiple apps concurrently, whereas
ROS is designed to work for a single running app. The latest version of ROS
does include some primitive support for access controls on ROS nodes to
limit the types of services nodes can use. We plan to use these mechanisms
as a part of Frak in future versions of our software.
Additional robot frameworks and operating systems include CARMEN
used for tour guide robots [15] and the CRAM framework for mobile manip-
ulation and control programs [16]. A recent position paper by Finnicum and
King [17] argued for applying OS principles to robot apps, and a position pa-
per by Gunter [18] argued for enabling embedded systems (e.g., microwaves)
to run Java programs, but the focus of these works is on security, whereas
we focus on abstractions for apps.
Recently, an online marketplace, called Robot App Store, opened to pro-
mote robot apps [19]. The existence of Robot App Store and the scores of
robot applications in the marketplace suggests that developers are becoming
interested in programming apps for robots.
In the Robot App Store model, developers upload complete system ROM
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images and ad-hoc instructions for uploading the app from a computer to a
robot. Each app must be ported to a new robot, and has a different and
complete system image. When apps run, they have exclusive and complete
control over the system. Our Frak system is a stark contrast to the model
being used by Robot App Store. In the Frak model, apps run on top of
high-level robot abstractions, enabling apps to run on any robot hardware
that Frak supports, and Frak supports multiple apps running at the same
time, providing a more rich and portable execution environment for robot
apps. We believe that the combination of a marketplace, like Robot App
Store, and the runtime support in Frak will be a practical way to distribute
robot apps in the future.
A survey by Biggs and MacDonald [20] enumerates many different pro-
gramming languages and techniques one can use to program robots. More
recent work looks at making pancakes based on directions downloaded from
the internet and translating these directions into a prolog-like plan for a
robot to execute [21]. In contrast, our focus is on abstractions for enabling
app developers to write robot apps.
Our work on Frak is inspired by work on microkernel OS architectures
[22, 23, 24]. Our basic architecture is a microkernel architecture, but our
work focuses on unique issues inherent to programming apps for robots.
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CHAPTER 10
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we presented Frak, an operating system for robot apps. To
support robot apps, we introduced a novel “get help” abstraction, that en-
abled app developers and the Frak framework to deal with uncertainty with-
out complicating app software. We also built an object abstraction for man-
aging users and locations, and a UI that enabled robot apps to interact with
users without having to know the details of the underlying robot hardware.
Frak also included mechanisms for multiplexing robot hardware. Although
many of these techniques were guided by principles established in more tra-
ditional computer systems, the fundamentally probabilistic and uncertain
environment in which our system ran forced us to make some novel design
decisions.
To showcase Frak, we built a robot, Isaac, and 14 apps that we evaluated in
our office in a realistic deployment. All of our runs succeeded often with the
aid of the “get help” abstraction that we built to deal with unexpected states
and events. Operating with just the localization and identification algorithms
that we implimented, the apps would have been unreliable – however, we
found that the robot was quite reliable when allowed to ask for help.
In addition, We have demonstrated that a robot built from commodity
parts can use its sensors and a system like CLASS to accurately identify and
locate the people that it needs to interact with. By recording sensor readings
over time, the robot adapted to the people in its environment and learned
how to weight each factor’s inputs appropriately. CLASS showed itself to be
resilient to attack by a reasonably skilled attacker, and will become increas-
ingly resilient and accurate as more factors are added. The inclusion of an
audit log allowed for CLASS to re-evaluate its past decisions and potentially
catch earlier mistakes.
Lastly, we have shown that a robot application can be made secure without
the developer having to understand the details of the specific robot platform
40
that it is running on. The “coffee” application required no knowledge of
what factors CLASS was using to compare people. As robotics continue to
become more mainstream, it is important that developers be given tools such
as CLASS so that they can create more secure applications.
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